In the case of Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, the 6th Circuit recently ruled that volunteer firefighters who receive hourly compensation of $15 are employees for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Family Medical Leave Act (FLMA).

The ruling arose when a former police dispatcher, Paul Mendel, brought an FMLA suit against his former employer, the of Gibraltar, Michigan. 

The city argued that it was exempt from the FMLA because it did not have 50 employees. Gibraltar had only 41 employees. However, Gibraltar had 25 to 30 “volunteer” firefighters who were compensated $15 per hour for responding to alarms.

Mendel argued that when the volunteer firefighters are added to the 41 employees, the city of Gibraltar had the 50 employees. 

The Court determined that the facts pertinent to the issue facing them related to the City’s “volunteer” firefighters and the nature of their responsibilities and of their relationship to the City.

The Court looked at the Fair Labor Standards Act to determine whether these “volunteer” firefighters fell within the scope of the FMLA’s definition of an “employee.” The Court focused on a section of the FLSA that addresses this issue. The FLSA generally defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The section goes on to state that the definition of “employ” means “to suffer or permit to work.” § 203(g). The Sixth Circuit referred to the Supreme Court in noting the “striking breadth” of the FLSA’s expansive definition of “employ.” The Supreme Court has stated that the definition “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”  Congress amended the FLSA to include a definition of volunteers, so the Sixth Circuit had to determine "whether the wages paid to the firefighters constituted “compensation” or merely a “nominal fee.” If the hourly wages were compensation, then the firefighters were employees under the FLSA. Conversely, if the wages are merely a nominal fee, then the firefighters are volunteers expressly excluded from the FLSA’s definition of employee."

The 6th Circuit concluded that the volunteer firefighters should be considered employees.  The judges held that, "under the relevant authority and the facts of this case, we are constrained to hold that, simply put, the substantial wages paid to these firefighters constitute compensation, not nominal fees, which makes the Gibraltar firefighters employees, not volunteers, for purposes of the FLSA and FMLA."